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THE PLACE OF WORSHIP IN SOLEMNIZATION OF A MARRIAGE 
 
Under the 1949 Act a marriage can be solemnised in an Anglican church by a 
clergyman; in a registered building (being a certified place of worship) in the 
presence of an authorised person or registrar; in approved premises in the presence 
of a registrar. The essential elements are the place of the ceremony and the presence 
of one of the designated officials. MA v JA ….1 
 
In introducing a facility to enter into a civil marriage on approved premises, hedged 
around by Regulations governing approval and by a requirement … for the presence 
at the wedding of both the superintendent registrar and the local registrar…, 
Parliament in 1994 clearly proceeded on the basis that a building would secure 
registration for the solemnisation of marriages under section 41 only if it truly was a 
place of public religious worship. 
Regina (Hodkin and another) v. Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages2  
 
In two recent English cases, the significance of “place” in the valid solemnization of a 
marriage has been highlighted. In the first case, MA v JA (2012), a question arose as to the 
validity of a marriage celebrated in Muslim form in a mosque. There was no doubt as to the 
parties’ intention to get married, but they were uninformed as to the law of marriage and 
failed to obtain a license. Furthermore, the imam officiating at the wedding did not realize 
that the parties wanted the marriage to be a legally binding one, rather than merely a religious 
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celebration following a civil wedding. In line with previous cases where an irregular marriage 
has taken place and the court has to decide whether it is valid or non-existent,3 Moylan J had 
to consider whether the steps undertaken included sufficient “hallmarks of marriage” to be a 
marriage for the purposes of the Marriage Act 1949. In that context, he deemed neither the 
exchange of vows nor the obtaining of a license to be decisive.  Indeed in an earlier case a 
license was described as merely “part of the preliminary paperwork provided by the state to 
the parties and the officiating minister to indicate a fulfilment of, or compliance with the 
requirements of capacity to marry and the like. … [I]t is no more than that”.4  On the other 
hand, Moylan J considered it essential that the marriage should take place in a registered 
place of worship.   
In the second case, R (Hodkin and another) v. Registrar General of Births, Deaths and 
Marriages (2013), the United Kingdom Supreme Court addressed difficult questions 
concerning the nature of religion and of religious worship for the purpose of deciding 
whether a Church of Scientology could be registered as a place of worship for the purpose of 
solemnization of a marriage.  It is logical to assume that a decision on such weighty matters 
by the highest court in the land was elicited for grave reasons. 
These cases, whether through their wording or the significance of the issues decided 
merely as a preliminary to registering premises for a marriage, indicate that the place of 
solemnization of marriage is central to the validity of the marriage itself, a conclusion that 
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 The nullity of a marriage for failure to comply with certain provisions of the Marriage Act 
1949 is stated in s.49 of that Act, but in each case the non-compliance must be “knowing and 
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may seem surprising. This article contributes to an understanding of “place” in the law 
regulating the formalities of marriage, and current challenges to its central role.  
Section A explains how place, and more specifically “place of worship”, emerged as a 
constituent element in the celebration of a valid marriage. It traces how the Catholic Church, 
competing with family and kinship groups, gradually exerted control over the substance and 
formalities of marriage, so that eventually most marriages were celebrated in a church. Just at 
the point in time when this control had become virtually complete, however, the rise of the 
nation State, combined with changes in the sources and allocation of wealth and with 
Reformation ideas and conflicts, led to the emergence of new interests to be satisfied. The 
different trajectories of the struggles between rival political and religious factions have had a 
lasting influence on the law concerning the formalities of marriage 
Section B then highlights some of the problems of complexity in the modern English law 
governing marriage at a registered place of worship, and the particular impact of the Marriage 
(Same Sex Couples) Act 2013.  The choice to use place of worship as a significant element in 
the formalities of marriage has led to an accumulation of technical amendments to the law.  
Moreover, a comparative survey of laws on the solemnization of marriages (Section C) 
demonstrates the exceptional character of the approach adopted by English law. But, it also 
highlights some of the problems arising out of alternative solutions.  A particular issue being 
confronted in a number of jurisdictions is a rising demand for marriages which are secular but 
nevertheless personally meaningful to the parties involved – a demand which is not 
adequately met by marriages at vital statistics offices or in other bureaucratic environments. 
Finally the article will examine the attempts that have been made in recent decades to 
reform English law in respect of the formalities of marriage and the factors that have 
prevented such reform (Section D), before surveying the recent drivers for change that seem 
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destined to dethrone ‘place’ as an essential element in a valid marriage and the interests that 
any reform of the law should strive to satisfy (Section E).  
 
A – THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PLACE OF WORSHIP IN THE SOLEMNIZATION OF 
MARRIAGES: A BRIEF HISTORY 
 
(i) Marriage in facie ecclesiae: place introduced 
 
In the pre-Christian era in Europe, marriage was a private affair. Roman and Germanic 
marriages were negotiated between families.  A marriage was a contract, and parental control 
was of the essence.5 In this context the place of the marriage was irrelevant (except in so far 
as it reflected the power relationship between the families concerned). 
The early Church, reflecting the culture within which it was embedded, was content to 
work within this framework of marriage laws.6 It was not until after the fall of the Roman 
Empire that the Church began to impose its own view of marriage, not until the 11th century 
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 R.H.Helmholz, Marriage Litigation in Medieval England (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1974), 4-5; G.E. Howard, A History of Matrimonial Institutions Chiefly in 
England and the United States with an Introductory Analysis Vol.1 (Chicago: University of 
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Law and Family in the United States and Western Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1989), 19 ff.  
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that the canon law of Rome began to develop, and only in the 12th century that marriage was 
first recognized as a sacrament.7  Over the centuries, a tradition of celebrating a marriage at 
the church door developed.8 The formal celebration of the marriage was according to custom, 
but was followed by a bride-mass. Then from the 13th century onwards, priestly involvement 
in the solemnization of the marriage itself became more common, and the ceremony 
gradually moved to the interior of the church.9 
This was nevertheless by no means a smooth process. During the 12th century it became 
established as a principle of canon law that “consent in the present tense” without 
consummation was sufficient to create a valid marriage.10  However theologically sound that 
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 Helmholz, Marriage Litigation, 45; Howard, Matrimonial Institutions, 332. 
8
 Howard, Matrimonial Institutions, 295 ff. 
9
 Ibid. 309. This move is linked to changes in marriage customs which began to allow the 
bride to appoint a marriage officiant: “[F]rom the moment that custom sanctioned the choice 
of any third person in place of the father or other natural protector, the clergy appropriated 
this function as their exclusive right. While the church ‘bestowed her blessing upon tradition 
through the natural guardian, she directed against the lay chosen guardian her 
excommunication.’" (quoting Sohm, Das Recht der Eheschliessung (Weimar, 
1875) 164). 
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 James A. Brundage, Law, Sex and Christian Society in Medieval Europe (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2009), 268-269. This had been a much contested question, and 
in the medieval period generated a large case law analyzing whether particular forms of 
verbal expression constituted consent in the present tense (per verba de praesenti):  Howard, 
Matrimonial Institutions, 340 ff. Helmholz, Marriage Litigation, 25-73. 
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proposition might be, it weakened parental control over marriages,11 and at the same time 
undermined the efforts of the Church to assert control.  Lay marriage was declared by the 
Church to be illegal, but it was nevertheless valid. Ecclesiastical sanctions, which were the 
only penalty for breach of canon law rules concerning the involvement of the Church in 
marriages, including an obligation to publicize the ceremony through the calling of banns, 
had insufficient dissuasive effect.  It was possible for couples to marry  
 
“in a house, in the street, in the fields, or at a tavern … It was possible for a young man 
balancing on a ladder to slip a ring onto the finger of a thirteen-year-old girl through the 
grating of her window, or for two lovers to exchange consent while touching hands 
through a hole in the wall.”12  
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 At a time when developing rules of primogeniture made parental control over marriage 
increasingly important: Charles Donoghue Jr., “Law, Marriage, and Society in the Later 
Middle Ages: A Look at the English and ‘Franco-Belgian’ Regions”, in Proceedings of the 
Thirteenth International Congress of Medieval Canon Law (Esztergom-Budapest, August 3–
9, 2008), Monumenta Iuris Canonici C:14, ed. Peter Erdö and Sz. Anzelm Szuromi, (Città del 
Vaticano: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 2010), 17–39. 
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 Cecilia Cristellon, “Does the Priest Have to Be There? Contested Marriages before Roman 
Tribunals: Italy, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries,” Österreichische Zeitschrift für 
Geschichtswissenschaften 20:3 (2009): 17. 
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In England,13 litigation concerning the validity of marriages was a prominent feature of 
court business during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Helmholz notes: 
 
We must see the process by which the church vindicated its control over marriage 
as a longer and more gradual process than has hitherto been thought. It did not come 
with the definitive formulation of the classical canon law in the twelfth century. 
Rather it was the product of slow growth and acceptance.14 
 
It was not until the sixteenth century, at the Council of Trent, that the step was taken to 
make validity of marriages dependent on certain requirements of form. The Tametsi decree of 
1563 finally required the presence of the parish priest for a valid marriage. But even then, the 
place of marriage was not determinative. The marriage did not have to take place in the 
church itself.15 
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 Howard, Matrimonial Institutions, 310 f., comparing English and French sources, suggests 
that priestly control of marriage was relatively slow to develop in England. He also notes that 
marriage at the church door continued to be common in England until the 16th century. The 
liturgies of Edward VI and Elizabeth I were the first to require the ceremony to be performed 
in the body of the church. 
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 Helmholz, Marriage Litigation, 72. Canon law rules on marriage were significantly in 
conflict with previous traditions. For example, earlier customs did not regard marriage as 
indissoluble. Moreover, marriages within kinship groups were likely to be found invalid as 
within the prohibited degrees.  
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 See now Can.1118 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law, under which marriage in a church is 
the default position, but marriage in another “suitable place” may be authorized.   
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(ii) Laying the groundwork: a rejected experiment and a monitoring system 
 
At about the time that the Tametsi decree was reflecting the control the Catholic Church 
had obtained over marriage, wholly new challenges were being faced as a result of economic, 
political and religious upheavals in Europe.  The decline of the feudal system and the rise of 
new centers of wealth and education, the rise of the nation state, religious pluralism as a 
result of the Reformation – all these undermined the claims of the Catholic Church to 
universal authority, and in the process the impact of the Tametsi decree. 
New ideas about the nature of marriage emerged. Reformation theologians denied that 
marriage was a sacrament, or that it fell within ecclesiastical competence. The various 
Protestant traditions each “provided a different theological formula for integrating the 
inherited contractual, natural, and spiritual perspectives on marriage”,16 but, initially at least, 
they drew on existing canon law as to the actual formalities for marriage.17 Nevertheless, in 
some States, the conception of marriage as a civil rather than an ecclesiastical matter led to 
more radical innovations. In parts of the Netherlands a civil alternative to religious marriages 
was introduced in the late 16th century as a result of the Reformation. From the 1570s the 
cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Gouda allowed marriage before a civil authority,18 and 
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 John Witte Jr., “Church, State, and Marriage: Three Reformation Models,” Word & World 
23 (2003): 42. 
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 Ibid. 44. 
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 Variously a magistrate, notary or the aldermen of the city:  Henk Looijesteijn and Marco 
H.D. van Leeuwen, “Establishing and Registering Identity in the Dutch Republic,” in 
Registration and Recognition: Documenting the Person in World History (Proceedings of the 
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in 1580 the province of Holland introduced a uniform marriage law which provided the 
option of marrying before a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church or a magistrate.19  
Civil marriage was also introduced in England. In the period between the break from 
Rome and the Civil War, despite much dissatisfaction and calls for changes in the law, new 
measures relating to the regulation of marriage were few and limited.20 But one of the 
legislative measures enacted during the Commonwealth period was the 1653 Act touching 
Marriages and the Registring thereof; and also touching Births and Burials. The Act was 
extraordinarily radical, in that it prohibited marriages performed by the clergy21 and 
introduced civil marriage, performed by the Justice of the Peace, as the only valid form. 
                                                          
British Academy 182), ed. Keith Breckenridge and Simon Szreter (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 214-219.  Regulation of marriage was regarded as a priority in order to prevent 
property disputes. All those intending to marry had to appear before civil authorities and 
provide evidence of e.g. name, address, parental consent before being given permission to 
publicize the wedding. 
19
 Ibid. Again the legislation also included measures concerning publicity and parental 
consent to prevent clandestine marriages. 
20
 Canons were enacted in 1571, 1575, 1584, 1597, 1604 and 1640: Richard H. Helmholz, 
The Oxford History of the Laws of England: Volume I - The Canon Law and Ecclesiastical 
Jurisdiction from 597 to the 1640s (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004), 264-9.  The core 
rules regulating marriage remained unchanged, however. Modifications included raising the 
age of valid consent to marriage to sixteen for boys and fourteen for girls, and clarifying the 
circumstances in which a license to marry without banns could be issued.    
21
 This prohibition was withdrawn in 1657.  Thereafter both civil and religious ceremonies 
were permitted until 1660. 
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McLaren comments on the good order and reliability of the registers of marriage during the 
Commonwealth period.22 Nevertheless, along with other interregnum measures, the 1653 Act 
was immediately repealed in 1660 with the restoration of the monarchy. The “Act for 
Confirmation of Marriages” confirmed that marriages made under Cromwell’s legislation 
were to be regarded as if they had been solemnized according to the rites and ceremonies of 
the Church of England.23  The Puritan experiment was over, and a reversion to tradition was 
celebrated.  
A feature of the law of 1653 was the fact that members of all religious groups were 
treated equally. A civil marriage was essential in each case. Reversion to the ecclesiastical 
regulation of marriages reintroduced religious discrimination. When Anglicanism was 
revived as the state religion only an Anglican marriage was recognised as valid. This was 
consistent with other restrictions on non-Anglicans imposed by a state fearful of renewed 
religious hostilities and endorsed by a people who had chafed under enforced Puritanism. 
Under the Test and Corporation Acts, introduced as from 1661, the taking of communion in 
an Anglican Church was a precondition for any civil or military office, and for access to 
university.  The Act of Uniformity of 1662 prescribed the acceptable form of prayers, 
administration of sacraments and other rites for the established church. It led to the ejection 
of from Anglican churches of all “non-conformists”, who fractured into smaller dissenting 
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 Dorothy McLaren, “The Marriage Act of 1653: Its Influence on the Parish Registers” 
Population Studies 28 (1974): 319 - challenging the view that many people ignored the new 
marriage laws and continued as before. Just as today, the existence of a civil wedding need 
not have ruled out a parallel religious one. 
23
 R.B. Outhwaite, Clandestine Marriage in England: 1500-1800 (London: Hambledon Press, 
1995), 13. 
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groups.24 Within a few years the violent reaction against Puritanism had subsided and a 
greater degree of toleration was advocated. New ideas of political philosophy and economy 
promoted toleration as conducive to commercial growth: acceptance of differences in the 
spiritual realm allowed collaboration in temporal matters such as trade and industry. Among 
other things, the Act of Toleration 1689 allowed dissenters to establish their own places of 
worship. But controls were still in place: no assembly for religious worship was allowed until 
the place of meeting had been certified,25 nor was preaching permitted except with open 
doors. It is this legislation on registration of places of worship that established the foundation 
on which later regulation of non-Anglican marriages has been built.  
 
(iii) Lawless churches: place subverted 
 
An expectation that marriage should normally take place in a church does seem to have 
become established by the 18th century,26 but the fees charged for marriage licenses – which 
granted permission to marry despite the existence of some substantive impediment or to 
dispense with a procedural requirement (such as the publishing of banns in a particular 
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 Further restrictions were also imposed by the Quaker Act 1662, the Conventicle Act 1664 
and the Five Mile Act 1665. 
25
 Section XIX. 
26
 In Marriage Law and Practice in the Long Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), Rebecca Probert demonstrates that by this time private exchanges of 
vows (per verba de praesenti) were interpreted as contracts to marry, which could be 
enforced by the ecclesiastical courts. It was expected that the marriage itself would take place 
in a church. 
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location) – became a lucrative source of income for the clergy,27  many of whom became 
increasingly cavalier about compliance with the canon law rules they were supposed to 
enforce.  So called “lawless churches” sprang up, offering their services to those who sought 
a quick or private wedding.28 
Most notable in the early eighteenth century was the growth of Fleet marriages. Since the 
Fleet was a debtors’ prison, clergymen offering their services from the Fleet essentially had 
nothing to lose from the imposition of further fines. Penalties on the Warden of the Fleet 
eventually stopped weddings taking place in the prison chapel itself, but business spilled out 
into the surrounding streets: to the taverns and ale houses. A Fleet wedding offered 
convenience, reduced expense and entertainment laid on.29 It might be irregular, but it was 
legally valid. It has been estimated that by the 1740s as many as seventy per cent of 
marriages in London may have taken place in the Fleet.30 Few questions were asked about the 
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 Jeremy Boulton, “Itching After Private Marryings? Marriage Customs in 
Seventeenth-century London,” The London Journal 16 (1991): 15; John R. Gillis, For Better, 
for Worse: British Marriages, 1600 to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 
90: “While the bishops retained nominal control over sale, they often issued blanks to 
surrogates among the parish clergy, who, for the sake of the lucrative fees, made mockery of 
the controls on age and parental consent they were supposed to administer. Both bishops and 
surrogates were supposed to administer oaths and demand securities, but these too were laxly 
attended to.” 
28
 Outhwaite, Clandestine Marriage, 15-26; Gill Newton, “Clandestine marriage in early 
modern London: when, where and why?” Continuity and Change 29:2 (2014): 151 
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 Gill Newton, “Clandestine marriage in early modern London”. 
30
 Boulton, “Itching After Private Marryings?”. 
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identity and age of the parties, and there was a willingness to falsify the records for financial 
inducement.  These were “religious” marriages in name only. 
Parliamentary efforts to bring order to the law on solemnization of marriage were for a 
long time frustrated by the strongly conflicting interests of Lords and Commons. Property 
owners sought parental control over marriage – or at least adequate notice of a proposed 
marriage – so that they could ensure any alliance entered into was advantageous. There was 
always the risk of a fortune hunter whisking away an heir or heiress. On the other hand, the 
less wealthy were inclined to see marriage as an opportunity for advancement and resisted 
such restrictions. Moreover, the legislative proposals brought before the Commons tended to 
impose harsher penalties for infringement on the serving classes than their masters and so 
proved objectionable on several grounds.31  
 
(iv) The Marriage Acts 1753 to 1949: place enthroned 
Legislation regulating marriage was finally passed in 1753 under the close supervision of 
the Chancellor, Lord Hardwicke (the 1753 Act, or Lord Hardwicke’s Act). Lord Hardwicke 
had presided in several cases involving clandestine marriages and so had a particular interest 
in the subject.  Stone suggests that the success of the 1753 Act, after decades of failed 
initiatives, sprang from, inter alia, Lord Hardwicke’s close attention to drafting and finding 
common ground between factions, as well as “the use of rhetoric, logic, cajolery, and behind-
the-scenes threats, deals and lobbying”.32 
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 Outhwaite, Clandestine Marriage, 65 ff. 
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 L. Stone, Road to Divorce: England 1530-1987 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) 
122-123. See also for the passage of the Act, Outhwaite, Clandestine Marriage, Ch 4. 
14 
 
While Lord Hardwicke’s Act contained a number of radical features, its most striking 
innovation was the fact that it rendered invalid marriages not conducted in accordance with 
the prescribed formalities – thus employing the approach that had been adopted by the 
Catholic Church in the Tametsi decree two hundred years previously.33 The prescribed 
formalities under Lord Hardwicke’s Act were nevertheless more stringent. A marriage, in 
order to be valid, had to take place in a parish church or public chapel, be preceded by banns 
or a license, and be conducted by a minister of the Church of England.34 The rules on banns 
and licenses meant, in effect, that the marriage had to take place in the church of the parish 
where the one of the parties had been living for the previous four weeks. For the first time, 
location mattered – not just as a matter of convenience for administrative purposes, or a rule 
of ecclesiastical law often honored in the breach, but as a binding legislative requirement for 
a valid marriage.  Moreover, the rules relating to location encompassed both place of 
residence and place of worship. These provisions were designed to eliminate clandestine 
marriages, and more particularly to limit marriages without parental consent.35  Penalties for 
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 One factor in the success of the legislation was the changing attitude of society towards 
ecclesiastical laws and the binding nature of an exchange of promises: see Outhwaite, 
Clandestine Marriage, 87.   
34
 An exception was retained for the Archbishop of Canterbury’s Special Licence, under 
which the marriage could be celebrated at any time and in any place. This enabled the 
wealthy to continue to conduct private ceremonies at home.   
35
 They were further supported by a legal rule to the effect that the marriage of a minor by 
license was invalid without parental consent.  In the case of marriage of a minor by banns, the 
banns were invalid where parental objections were made known. 
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members of the clergy who infringed the law were strengthened. Rather than a fine or 
suspension, they risked transportation for fourteen years. 
Any continuing confusion over the status of a mere exchange of promises was thereby at 
an end,36 and for the “poorer sort” protection against seduction and bigamy was secured by 
the rules on location and publicity. The penalties on clergymen produced their effect, and the 
marriage trade in the centers for clandestine marriages quickly collapsed.37  
Although there was a variety of calls for the reform or repeal of the 1753 Act, it 
remained in force for the next seventy years. Amendment, followed by repeal and 
replacement, occurred in 1823, and further reforms followed in 1836. 38 One concern was the 
fact that the strictness of the criteria for validity in the 1753 Act could operate harshly in 
some circumstances, and could be open to abuse.39 But a further cause of dissatisfaction was 
the position of non-conformists and Roman Catholics under the Act. At the time it was 
adopted, both were in a weak position. Quakers and Jews lobbied for exceptional treatment, 
which they could justify on the basis of the fact that they had a long tradition of marriage 
according to their own rites, and that they kept diligent records of those marriages. The Act 
specifically stated that “nothing in this Act contained shall extend to” marriages between 
Jews and between Quakers, but non-conformists and Roman Catholics were obliged to marry 
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 See Outhwaite, Clandestine Marriage, 84. 
37
 Outhwaite, Clandestine Marriage, 127. 
38
 For details see Outhwaite, Clandestine Marriage, Ch 7 and Stephen Cretney, Family Law 
in the Twentieth Century: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Ch1. 
39
 The 1823 Marriage Act provided that a marriage would only be automatically void if the 
parties had “knowingly and wilfully” failed to comply with its formal requirements. Where 
one of the parties was an innocent dupe, therefore, the marriage could no longer be annulled. 
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in an Anglican church unless they could afford a special license from the Archbishop of 
Canterbury. By the early 19th century, however, the Evangelical Revival had produced more 
confident and assertive Protestant denominations, and it had become widely accepted that 
expecting non-conformists to participate in an Anglican marriage ceremony contrary to their 
beliefs was both disrespectful to them and demeaning to the Church. Initial Dissenters’ 
Marriages Bills passed in the House of Commons foundered in the House of Lords, but in the 
1830s the project for “dissenting marriages” became linked to the establishment of a central 
population register, and this provided the way to an acceptable solution for both non-
conformists and Catholics.40 The General Register Office and the office of Superintendent 
Registrar were created in 1836 by the Act for registering Births, Deaths, and Marriages in 
England. Marriage under a registrar’s certificate – providing the publicity and verification 
functions provided by banns in the case of Anglican marriages – was also introduced by the 
Act for Marriages in England which was adopted on the same date (the 1836 Act). Under the 
latter Act, a place certified as a place of worship could be registered for the celebration of 
marriages therein. The form and ceremony of the marriage were a matter for the church 
concerned, provided that a specified form of words was used to express consent to marriage 
and the marriage was solemnized in the presence of a registrar and two witnesses.41 
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 Rebecca Probert, Marriage Law and Practice, ch.9. 
41
 The requirement that a registrar be present continued to be a source of grievance until it 
was removed by the Marriage Act 1898. See further, Cretney, Family Law in the Twentieth 
Century, 19-20. 
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Since the preceding legislation42 used the place of marriage as an important factor in its 
regulatory framework, it was perhaps logical to conceive of the regulation of the marriages of 
other religious denominations in a similar way and to focus on the (registered) place of 
worship. The option of marriage in a register office was included in the 1836 Act for 
“persons who shall object to marry under the Provision of this Act in any such registered 
building”.  It was clearly the expectation that religious marriages would be the norm, and the 
register office option was for people with strong conscientious objections.43 In recent years, 
however, the proportion of marriages taking place in a register office has reached 70 per 
cent.44  
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 The most recent prior legislation, the 1823 Act for Amending the Laws respecting the 
Solemnization of Marriages in England, required publication of the banns in the church or 
chapel for the parish where the parties were resident, and solemnization of the marriage in 
that church or chapel “and in no other place whatsoever”. 
43
 Hansard includes a speech by the Bishop of London in 1839 – complaining of the harm 
done to the Church by the new law on registration of births because there was no longer any 
necessary connection with baptism – to the effect that “[t]he Marriage Act would do but little 
harm, because it would never be much acted on…” HL Deb March 5, 1839 series 3, vol. 45 
cc1253-61 
44
 Statistics from 1837-2010 relating to the form of ceremony can be found in ONS Release 
Marriages in England and Wales (Provisional), 2011 (June 26, 2013), in Table 2 of the 
reference table providing details marriages by area of occurrence, type of ceremony and 
denomination, accessed  October 2, 2013, http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-
reference-tables.html?edition=tcm%3A77-292280. 
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(v) Conclusions 
There is a long history of conflicting interests as to the rules on the formalities of marriage. 
The Church sought slowly to instill its vision of marriage into the peoples it served, and once 
it had recognized marriage as a sacrament, it had an incentive to exert control over the 
conduct of marriages. It could also offer the advantages of infrastructure and an educated 
priesthood – promoting certainty and allowing record keeping.  But the rule of canon law that 
“consent in the present tense” was sufficient for the formation of a valid marriage prevented 
the Church from capitalizing on these advantages.  In particular, it placed the Church in 
conflict with the landowning classes, who wanted marriage to be subject to greater 
formalities so that they were better able to control the marriages of their offspring. And that 
desire increased as a result of the incentives provided by the laws of property and inheritance. 
At the same time, there seem always to have been those entering into marriage who, for good 
reasons or bad, have desired to preserve the privacy and individuality of their actions.   
These conflicts remained unresolved until the particular constellation of events which 
permitted the adoption of Lord Hardwicke’s Act – including a tradition of church marriage 
which had by the 18th century become settled, concern over several high profile clandestine 
marriages, disapprobation of Fleet marriages, and the brokering skills of Lord Hardwicke 
himself. It is only through the 1753 Act that the place of marriage becomes an element 
essential to validity.  Since 1753, in England and Wales, regulation of the places in which a 
marriage may validly be solemnized has become an integral element of the legislation 
governing marriage. As a consequence, the legislation requiring non-conformist places of 
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worship to be registered has continued in being almost solely for the purpose regulating 
marriages.45  The next section will explore the current complex rules on place of marriage. 
 
B – REGISTERED PLACE OF WORSHIP WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE 1949 
MARRIAGE ACT 
 
(i) General principles 
 
The Marriage Act 1949 (the 1949 Act), represents a consolidation of the previous 
legislation, including various “minor amendments”.46  In view of the controversy that has 
habitually attached to legislation on marriage, it is noteworthy that the 1949 Act was passed 
by Parliament under the Consolidation of Enactments (Procedure) Act 1949, allowing it to be 
adopted without full debate by both Houses. 
The focus on “place” remains evident in 1949 Act. The Act is divided into six parts, of 
which Parts II and III are the principal ones relevant to this topic.47 
                                                          
45
 A further reason for registering is to obtain exemption from business rates.  It is, however, 
clear from the Explanatory Note to s.68 of the Local Government Act 2003 that registration is 
merely a convenient evidence of entitlement to exemption. In 2003 it was anticipated that the 
Places of Worship Registration Act 1855 would be repealed as a result of proposed changes 
to the law governing marriage (see further on these proposed changes below at 49 ff.) 
46
 See further Cretney, Family Law in the Twentieth Century, 23-24. 
47
 Part I of the 1949 Act deals with restrictions on marriage, such as the prohibition of 
marriages between those who are closely related and the age at which the parties can lawfully 
marry (with or without the consent of a parent or guardian); Part IV deals with the particulars 
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Part II of the Act deals with the current rules on marriage according to the rites of the 
Church of England. Marriage following the publication of banns continues to be available. It 
is possible to dispense with banns under a (common or special) license or Superintendent 
Registrar’s certificate.48 The fundamental objective of these rules is to ensure that adequate 
publicity is given to the marriage in the parish or parishes where the parties live, so that 
objections to the marriage can be raised if appropriate, and that additional checks on 
compliance with the criteria for capacity to marriage are made before the issue of a license or 
certificate which grants dispensation from the requirement to call banns.49  The locations in 
which banns may be published is therefore regulated in the Act. Under s.12 a marriage may 
only be solemnized in a church or chapel where the banns have been published, and under s.6 
the banns must be published in the parish where at least one of the persons to be married is 
resident, or in the parish which is the “usual place of worship of the persons to be married or 
                                                          
of registration of marriages and maintenance of records; Part V ensures that the scheme of the 
act applies to naval, military and air force chapels; and Part VI sets out certain general 
provisions, including statutory offences relating to the solemnization and registration of 
marriages. 
48
 The greater freedom of time and place of marriage under the Archbishop of Canterbury’s 
special license also continues to exist. It was supplemented in 1970 by similar provision for 
non-Anglican marriages under a Registrar General’s Certificate (Marriage (Registrar 
General’s License) Act 1970), but restricted to cases where one of the intending parties to the 
marriage is seriously ill and not expected to recover, and so cannot be moved. 
49
  As a result of doubts about the effectiveness of these checks, an Immigration Bill currently 
before Parliament is introducing compulsory civil preliminaries in cases where one of the 
parties is a non-EEA national: Immigration, HC Bill (2013-14) [128]. 
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of one of them”.50 The ceremony itself is not regulated by the statute, being left to Anglican 
canon law.   
Alternative ways of getting married must be authorized by Superintendent Registrar’s 
certificates and are regulated by Part III of the Act, which has undergone several amendments 
since 1949. The variety of marriages that may now be authorized under a certificate, some of 
which are defined by location and some by the rites or usages employed, are now set out in 
s.26(1)(a)-(e) of the 1949 Act:  
(a) a marriage in a registered building according to such form and ceremony as the 
persons to be married see fit to adopt; 
(b)  a marriage in the office of a Superintendent Registrar;  
(bb) a marriage on approved premises; 
(c) a marriage according to the usages of the Society of Friends (commonly called 
Quakers);51 
(d) a marriage between two persons professing the Jewish religion according to the 
usages of the Jews;  
(dd) the marriage (other than a marriage in pursuance of paragraph (c) or (d) above) of a 
person who is house-bound or is a detained person at the place where he or she 
usually resides; 
(e) a marriage according to the rites of the Church of England in any church or chapel in 
which banns of matrimony may be published. 
                                                          
50
 But see further below at 23-24. 
51
 This provision may be contrasted with the following one, under which both persons must 
profess the Jewish religion. Section 47 establishes when a marriage according to the usages 
of the Quakers may be authorized even if one of the parties is not a Quaker. 
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The exceptional position of Jews and Quakers, first introduced in Lord Hardwicke’s Act, 
has been retained in the 1949 Act.  Although the original legislation did not confer validity on 
Jewish and Quaker marriages52 – it merely stated that “nothing in this Act contained shall 
extend to” marriages among these groups – the 1836 Act “confirmed” that the marriages of 
Jews and Quakers according to their “usages” were good in law and legislation since that date 
has maintained their separate status, and has used wording that clarifies the point that such 
marriages are valid.  The place of solemnization is not, therefore, legally relevant to the 
validity of such marriages. 
The 1949 Act also retains the approach introduced by the 1836 Marriage Act in relation 
to solemnization of marriages by other religious bodies.  Marriage in a registered building is 
permitted “according to such form and ceremony as the persons to be married see fit to 
adopt”.53 A registered building for this purpose must be a registered place of worship under 
the Places of Worship Registration Act 1855 and also be registered for the solemnization of 
marriages under s.41 of the 1949 Act.  The requirement in s.41 of the 1949 Act as originally 
drafted that a “separate” building certified as a place of worship may be registered for the 
solemnization of marriages proved to be an obstacle to the registration of mosques in the 
1980s, since mosques unite various functions and no separate place of worship can be 
identified.  Amending legislation was therefore introduced in 1990 to remove the requirement 
of separateness.54 
                                                          
52
 Rebecca Probert, Marriage Law and Practice, 234. 
53
 Subject to the consent of the minister or one of the trustees, owners, deacons or managers 
of the building (s.44 of the 1949 Act). 
54
 The Marriage (Registration of Buildings) Act 1990. 
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(ii) Liberalisation measures 
The emphasis on a designated place for marriages has proved to be something of a  
straitjacket. Not every church or registry office is an attractive location for a wedding.  
Towards the end of the twentieth century, as cohabitation became less stigmatized and 
average incomes rose, couples saved for a glamorous event to celebrate their relationship. In 
response to demand, the Marriage Act 1994 amended the 1949 Act, adding s.26(1)(bb), 
which allows civil marriages to take place at “approved premises”, 55 as authorized by local 
authorities, Such premises must be a “seemly and dignified venue for the proceedings”.56 
Hotels and stately homes feature in lists of approved premises, along with museums and even 
underground caverns, but ceremonies in the open air or in a marquee are not permitted. 
The pressure to extend the locations available for marriage ceremonies has also been felt 
by the Church of England, particularly as a result of the availability of new and attractive 
“approved premises”.  The Church of England Marriage Measure 2008 has relaxed the rules 
on the places in which a marriage can be solemnized.57 In substance, the Measure allows a 
                                                          
55
 Approval of premises is dealt with in s.46A of the 1949 Act. It provides for regulations to 
be made governing approval by local authorities of premises for the solemnization of 
marriages. The current regulations are the Marriages and Civil Partnerships (Approved 
Premises) Regulations 2005 (as amended). 
56
 Marriages and Civil Partnerships (Approved Premises) Regulations 2005, Sch.1 Para.1.  
See also The Registrar General's Guidance for the Approval of Premises as Venues for Civil 
Marriages and Civil Partnerships (6th ed, General Register Office, 2013). 
57
 See ss.6, 12, 15 and 16 of the Act. For an explanation of Church of England Measures, see 
Russell Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 62-63. 
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person to marry in a given parish if he or she can establish one of five “qualifying 
connections” with that parish. These include, by way of example, baptism or confirmation in 
the parish, regular public worship there for a period of six months at any time, and the 
marriage of a parent or grandparent there. 
No mixing of civil and religious ceremonies is permitted.58 Thus a civil ceremony should 
not include any religious elements. The 1949 Act specifically provides in s.46 for the option 
of having a religious ceremony after the civil one, making it clear that it is the civil ceremony 
that creates the valid marriage. 
Part III of the 1949 Act further specifies that the marriage should take place in the 
presence of a registrar (or, in the case of marriage solemnized in a registered building, an 
authorized person59) and with two additional witnesses. The premises should, so far as 
possible, be open to the public – in continued recognition of the role of publicity in regulating 
marriage.60 
 
(iii) The Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 
The law relating to marriage, including the law relating to the registration of places of 
worship for the solemnization of marriage,  has now been given a new layer of complexity by 
                                                          
The 2008 Measure co-exists with the 1949 Act without directly amending it, and requires the 
provisions of the Act on the publication of banns and the issue of certificates confirming the 
publication of banns to be read “as if” they incorporate the provisions of the Measure.   
58
 Sections 45(2), 45A(4) and 46B(4). 
59
 Section 43 deals with the appointment of authorized persons, who are responsible for 
registration of the marriage. 
60
 See ss.44(2), 45(1) and 46B(2). 
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the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013. This legislation, while in principle about the 
meaning of marriage and equal access to that institution, includes a further series of 
amendments to the 1949 Act in order, in particular, to deal with issues of conscience and the 
position of faith groups in relation to the solemnization of marriage.61 A marriage of a same-
sex couple may not be performed under Part II of the 1949 Act according to the rites of the 
Church of England without new legislation being brought forward.62 Other religious 
organizations will not automatically be able to conduct same-sex marriages under the Act but 
will have to “opt-in”.63 
                                                          
61
 The possibility of a conscience clause for registrars was raised several times by way of 
amendment to the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Bill, but was rejected: see Marriage (Same-
Sex Couples) Bill Deb 26 February 2013, col 220 ff and Deb 12 March 2013, col 268 ff; HC 
Deb 20 May 2013, col 926 ff (and especially col 934); HL Deb 17 June 2013, col 103 ff and 
HL Deb 8 July 2013, col 39 ff. 
62
 The Church of England itself may legislate for this by Measure, which will then require 
Parliamentary approval by an affirmative Resolution of each House. If the Church in Wales 
decides it wants to solemnise same-sex marriages, then the Lord Chancellor “must” bring 
forward the necessary amending legislation: s.8 of the 2013 Act.  
63
 As well as the possibility of “opting in” to the celebration of same sex marriages, the Act 
also provides for the possibility of “opting out” - that is, reversing the opt-in procedure in 
relation to any of its constituent elements. The opt-in and opt-out elements are listed in a 
table in s.2(3) of the 2013 Act . They include giving consents, applying for the registration of 
a building, and authorizing a person to be present at the solemnization of a marriage of a 
same-sex couple in a building registered under section 43A of the 1949 Act. 
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  In order to accommodate this change, s.26 of the Act has been amended to list the 
marriages that may be solemnized on the authority of superintendent registrar’s certificates 
without any opt-in, and new ss.26A and 26B have been inserted to regulate the procedures for 
opting in.  
For a religious organization to opt-in, written consent to the marriage of same sex 
couples must be given by the “relevant governing authority”.64 Religious organizations other 
than Quakers and Jews are once again dealt with by reference to a place of worship.65 A new 
s.43A requires separate registration of a building for the solemnization of marriages of same 
sex couples, in addition to the registration under s.41, but the opt-in must be exercised in 
writing before such registration takes place.66 Once the opt-in has been exercised, an 
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 In relation to the Quakers, this authority is specified in the new s.26B(3) of the 1949 Act. 
Clarification of the position for the different branches of Judaism is also provided in 
s.26B(5). For other religious organizations the governing authority is defined in s.26A(4) as 
“the person or persons recognized by the members of the relevant religious organization as 
competent for the purpose of giving consent for the purposes of this section” – a provision 
which may well give rise to disputes about centralization and decentralization of authority 
within various religious organizations (e.g. Baptists and Congregationalists). 
65
 Section 26A of the 1949 Act.. Section 43B provides for the appointment of authorized 
persons to allow same sex marriages to be solemnized without the presence of a registrar. 
66
 Once a religious organization has opted-in, the solemnization of a same-sex marriage at the 
residence of a housebound or detained person may take place in accordance with the rites of 
that organization (s.26B(6) of the 1949 Act) and a “death bed marriage” may be solemnized 
in accordance with those rites under s.1 of the Marriage (Registrar General’s Licence) Act 
1970 
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application for registration can then be made by the proprietor or trustees of the building 
under s.43A.67 So a building will have to be registered three times if it is to be used for the 
solemnization of same sex marriages: once as a place of worship, once under s.41 and finally 
under s.43A.   
There is further special provision in s.44A of the 1949 Act for the position where 
religious organizations are sharing a building under the Sharing of Church Buildings Act 
1969. Consent of just one of those organizations to the solemnization of marriages of same 
sex couples is enough for the purposes of registration under s.43A, but all the sharing 
organizations must consent to “use” of the building for that purpose.68 
The principles of the 2013 Act, excluding solemnization of same-sex marriages in 
accordance with the rites of the Church of England and requiring the consent of the relevant 
governing authority in the case of other religious organizations, are also applied to civil 
marriage followed by religious celebration under amendments to s.46 of the 1949 Act. 
The Act contains a so called “quadruple lock”69 to protect the position of individuals who 
have objections to same-sex marriage. Section 2 (1) provides, in so far as is relevant to the 
                                                          
67
 The application must be accompanied by a certificate stating that the relevant consent has 
been given and a copy of the consent: s.43A(3). 
68
 Section 44C deals with registration of shared buildings in circumstances not covered by the 
1969 Act.  Regulations can be made by the Secretary of State by statutory instrument to deal 
with this situation. 
69
 The quadruple lock is designed to do the following: 
1. Ensure that no religious organization or individual minister can be compelled to marry 
same-sex couples or to permit this to happen on their premises. 
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present article, that a person may not be compelled by any means (including by the 
enforcement of a contract or a statutory or other legal requirement) to (a) undertake an opt-in 
activity, or (b) refrain from undertaking an opt-out activity.70  Thus, for example, a person 
may neither be compelled to give their consent to registration of a place of worship for the 
solemnization of same sex marriages, nor be prevented from cancelling a consent that has 
been given. 
                                                          
2. Provide an opt-in system for religious organization who wish to conduct marriages for 
same-sex couples. 
3. Amend the Equality Act 2010 to reflect that no discrimination claims can be brought 
against religious organizations or individual ministers for refusing to marry a same-
sex couple. 
4. Ensure that legislation will not affect the canon law of the Church of England or the 
Church in Wales. As a result, if either church wanted to conduct a same-sex marriage, 
it would require a change to primary legislation at a later date and a change to canon 
law. 
70
 It also provides in s.2(2) that: 
A person may not be compelled by any means (including by the enforcement of a contract 
or a statutory or other legal requirement) – 
(a) to conduct a relevant marriage,  
(b) to be present at, carry out, or otherwise participate in, a relevant marriage, or 
(c) to consent to a relevant marriage being conducted, 
where the reason for the person not doing that thing is that the relevant marriage concerns 
a same sex couple.  
The protections in subs.(2) are also added to the Equality Act 2010 (s.110 and Sched.3). 
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If the “lock” works, then the structure of the law for solemnization of marriages 
following the 2013 Act can be retained in all its complexity. If not, then the willingness of 
many religious organizations to offer marriages services will be curtailed and a rethink of the 
current structure will be inevitable.  
 
C – A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 
 
Given the level of complexity that rules on place of marriage have created in English 
law, it is worth considering how far alternative approaches to regulation exist elsewhere, and 
whether they operate satisfactorily, with a view to considering whether any lessons can be 
learned for English law.This survey is limited to the formalities of solemnization of a 
marriage, while recognizing that in some jurisdictions a marriage may come into existence 
without any particular formalities, so that the distinction between marriage and other forms of 
intimate relationship is not easily drawn. 
It is striking that few states have, in fact, adopted or maintained an approach which 
regulates religious marriages by reference to a registered place of worship – although it exists 
in some former British colonies.71 On the other hand, French law, with its compulsory 
requirement of a civil ceremony, has had a strong influence on many legal systems. The 
development of French law was animated by the same themes that are evident with respect to 
                                                          
71
 See, for example, Uganda, Marriage Act 1904 (Cap 251) s.5 and s.22; Kenya, Marriage 
Act 1902 (Cap 150), s.7 and s.25.  The relevance of these provisions depends also on the 
significance of customary law.  In cases where the colonies were composed of emigrants 
seeking the religious freedom denied to them in England, it was never likely that they would 
adopt a law on registered places of worship intended to control dissenters. 
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English law: the dynamics of the relationship between Crown, Church and State; an emerging 
recognition of rights of equal treatment of different religious groups; the concern of the 
propertied classes to control the marriages of their offspring; and a desire to ensure the 
accurate recording of information relating to status.  While the concern for parental control is 
evident in the surprising proportion of articles of the Civil Code 1804 devoted to this and 
related issues,72 it was the desire to resolve problems concerning the validity of Protestant 
and Jewish marriages after two centuries of religious conflict that led to discussion of civil 
marriage as an option, and it was the chaos in the system of civil status recording by the 
Catholic Church during the Revolutionary struggles that provided the immediate catalyst for 
reform.  In the heady days of the Revolution civil marriage was endowed with quasi-religious 
elements, celebrating the Republic. Although many of the radical ideas of the revolutionaries 
in the area of family law, based on equality, were replaced by traditional, patriarchal notions 
in the Napoleonic Code, civil marriage remained, as a workable solution to a longstanding 
problem.73 
According to art.75 of the current Civil Code, a marriage takes place at the mairie74 in 
front of a civil status officer. The emphasis is on ensuring that the parties understand the legal 
obligations into which they are entering, followed by formal declarations of consent to the 
                                                          
72
 Arts 148-160, 173-175 and 182-186 
73
 James Traer, Marriage and the Family in Eighteenth-Century France (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1980). 
74
  In the commune where one of the parties, or one of their parents, is domiciled or has been 
resident for at least a month before giving notice of the marriage. Exceptions exist where 
there is a ‘serious impediment’. The Procureur de la République can give authorization for 
the marriage to take place at a party’s domicile or residence. 
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marriage in front of witnesses, and the drawing up of a certificate of marriage. In general, it is 
well established that any religious or other personalised ceremony must be postponed until 
after the civil marriage.75 
Many other countries also adopt the same approach as France, typically either as a result 
of French colonization or because of the intellectual impact of the French Civil Code, but also 
for ideological reasons in Communist or former Communist states. These include, for 
example, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany, Turkey, Japan, various Latin 
American and West African states, Russia and China.76  
At the other extreme, there are states in which the only valid form of marriage is in 
accordance with the parties’ personal law, that being the law of their religion. This is true in 
some Islamic states and also notably in Israel77 and Lebanon, states in which several religious 
laws co-exist but there is no provision for inter-faith marriages. In Israel there is also no 
provision for non-faith marriages. In Lebanon, a civil marriage between two people who had 
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 In fact, it is a criminal offence habitually to solemnize a religious marriage ceremony 
before the civil marriage has taken place: art.433-21 of the Criminal Code. 
76
 Lynn D. Wardle, “Marriage and Religious Liberty: Comparative Law Problems and 
Conflict of Laws Solutions,” Journal of Law & Family Studies 12 (2010): 315. 
77
 See, for example, the website of Hiddush, an NGO that campaigns for religious freedom 
and equality in Israel, accessed February 27, 2014, http://hiddush.org/subchannel-15-0-
Marriage.aspx. 
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officially deleted any faith reference from their state records was given recognition in 2013, 
but the legal consequences of this remain unclear because of the absence of legislation.78 
Elsewhere jurisdictions may offer both civil marriage and marriage conducted in 
religious or other customary form.79 The choice between a civil or a religious or customary 
marriage is permitted, at least in theory, in many former British colonies.80 Some jurisdictions 
                                                          
78
 Dalal Mawad, “Lebanon civil marriage raises hope for change” Aljazeera, May 2, 2013, 
accessed Feburary 27, 2014, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/04/20134309242619227.html. 
79
 But in some countries that officially recognize civil marriages, such marriages may not be 
available to members of a specified confession, or may be discouraged in practice as a result 
of cultural traditions.  
80
 The more complex reality is beyond the scope of this article.  See for an introduction to the 
position in Africa, inter alia, Robert Stibich, “Family Law in Some English-Speaking African 
States,” African Law Studies 2 (1969): 49; Sylvia Wairimu Kang’ara, “Beyond Bed and 
Bread: Making the African State Through Marriage Law Reform – Constitutive and 
Transformative Influences of Anglo-American Legal Thought,” Comparative Law Review 3 
(2012): 1.2, accessed January 6, 2014, 
http://www.comparativelawreview.com/ojs/index.php/CoLR/issue/archive. In mass 
emigration destinations, including the USA, Canada, and Australia, the extermination or 
marginalization of indigenous populations has had the effect that the status of customary 
marriages provoked little debate until recent decades with the rise in respect for the rights of 
indigenous peoples. Customary marriages between members of recognized Native American 
tribes are certainly recognized in the United States (Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 
564 (1980). See also U.S. v. Jarvison, 409 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 2005)) but the picture 
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strongly influenced in other respects by French or German law have retained the option 
between civil marriage at the relevant civil status office and religious marriage. Originally 
this occurred if the Catholic Church or another national church held a position of strength 
there.81  More recently, a wider range of marriages in religious form have been granted 
recognition in some states. This can by illustrated by examining the position in Spain,82 
Sweden83 and Scotland – jurisdictions which adopt distinctly different approaches.  
                                                          
in Canada is less certain (see Bradford W. Morse, “Indian and Inuit Family Law and the 
Canadian Legal System,” Am. Indian L. Rev. 8 (1980): 199) and aboriginal marriages are not 
recognized as such in Australia (see the Report of the Australian Law Reform Commission on 
the Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws (ALRC  Report 31), Part 12).  Recognition of 
common law marriages – or the protection afforded to cohabitants – nevertheless reduces the 
harshness of this stance in many cases.   
81
 See also Norman Doe, Law and Religion in Europe: A comparative introduction, (OUP, 
2011), pp 216-222, who highlights a third model whereby Roman Catholic marriages are 
recognized as having civil effect from the time of their ritual celebration, whereas marriages 
solemnized by ministers of other faith communities are regarded as civil marriages 
solemnized in a religious context, and are formed on subsequent civil registration. 
82
 See Zoila Combalía and María Roca,  “Religion and the Secular State in Spain,” in  
Religion and the Secular State: Interim Reports, prepared for the XVIIIth International 
Congress of Comparative Law, held 25 - 31 July 2010 in Washington, D.C. 632-634 and 639-
640, accessed February 27, 2014, http://www.iclrs.org/content/blurb/files/Spain.2a.pdf. 
83
 In Sweden, the Lutheran Church was the established church until 2000. See Maarit Jänterä-
Jareborg, “National Report for Sweden,” in Religion and the Secular State: Interim Reports, 
prepared for the XVIIIth International Congress of Comparative Law, held 25 - 31 July 2010 
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The most restrictive approach is found in Spain.84 Article 81 of the Spanish Constitution 
makes provision for the implementation of fundamental rights and freedoms through Organic 
Acts. Organic Act 7/1980 of 5 July of Religious Freedom was passed to implement the 
fundamental right of religious freedom. Under it, religious confessions that have “well 
recognized roots” in Spain can enter into an agreement with the State, modeled on the 
comparable agreements which have long regulated the relationship of the Spanish State with 
the Catholic Church. The recognized confessions are Protestants, Jews and Muslims (each of 
which has had to form an umbrella organization for its various constituent groups in order to 
enter into the agreement). Their agreements were signed on November 10, 1992, and as a 
consequence the civil validity of marriage ceremonies performed by each confession is 
recognized in Spain.85 By way of example, the agreement with the Protestant confession 
                                                          
in Washington, D.C. 682-683, accessed February 27, 2014, 
http://www.iclrs.org/content/blurb/files/Sweden.1.pdf. 
84
 Reforms have been proposed that would liberalize the position considerably, but they 
formed part of a package of measures on non-contentious jurisdiction that was rejected by the 
Spanish Parliament on December 11, 2014. 
85
 Combalia and Roca, “Religion and the Secular State in Spain,” 632-634 and 639-640. The 
arrangements under the agreements are different from those applying to the Catholic Church 
in that it is necessary to obtain a certificate of capacity from the civil authorities in advance of 
the marriage. Furthermore the agreements require the marriage to take place before the 
minister of religión in the presence of two witnesses, irrespective of whether the religious law 
in question has similar requirements.  
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provides that a marriage will be recognized if it is performed “before the minister of religion 
officiating at the ceremony”.86  
The Swedish Constitution allows a greater degree of flexibility. The free exercise of 
religion is made possible via the “Ordinance of Government” (Regeringsformen). The 
Ordinance includes the possibility for the State to delegate to religious communities certain 
state functions, and notable the solemnization of marriage.87 Since January 1, 2000, the law 
has provided a new procedure for the legal recognition of registered denominations. The State 
agency that processes applications for recognition (the Kammarkollegiet) also deals with the 
State’s delegations to denominations regarding the right to officiate marriage ceremonies. In 
each case the denomination must have at least 3,000 members and its activities must be 
organized such that it can be expected to pay regard to the rules of the Swedish Marriage 
Code. According to Jänterä-Jareborg, in 2008 approximately forty registered religious 
communities in Sweden had authorization to officiate at marriage ceremonies in Sweden.88  
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 Pedro Luis García Callejón, “El Matrimonio Religioso No Católico Ante El Derecho 
Español” (Universidad de Córdoba, Servicio de Publicaciones, 1993): 27. The arrangements 
under the agreements are different from those applying to the Catholic Church in that it is 
necessary to obtain a certificate of capacity from the civil authorities in advance of the 
marriage.  
87
 Implemented by Law 305 of 1993 on the Right to Officiate Marriages Within Religious 
Communities. 
88
 Jänterä-Jareborg, “Religion and the Secular State in Sweden,” 682-683. She also notes that 
when same sex marriage was authorized in Sweden in 2009, it was considered that the 
various denominations should decide for themselves whether or not to offer such marriages. 
To impose a state requirement would interfere with freedom of religion. Indeed, the various 
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Scotland takes a more liberal approach again. Although civil marriages are regulated in a 
similar way to those in England, the position in relation to religious marriages is quite 
different. Under the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 marriages can be solemnized by 
representatives of recognized religious bodies. These include a minister of the Church of 
Scotland, or a minister, clergyman, pastor, or priest of a religious body, or a person 
recognized by a religious body as entitled to solemnize marriages on its behalf.89 Temporary 
registration of a celebrant is also possible under s.12 of the Act. It is the person, and their 
status as part of a recognized organization, that is relevant – not the place of solemnization. 
These provisions have been used to approve marriage celebrants from a wide range of 
religious bodies.90 Prior to recent amendments, they were also relied on to permit the 
authorization of humanist celebrants.91 In 2005, Scotland's Registrar General concluded that 
                                                          
religious denominations may impose other conditions on their willingness to solemnize 
marriages, such as a requirement that both parties to the marriage are members of that 
denomination. 
89
 Sections 8 of the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 (the 1977 Act) differentiates between 
prescribed religious bodies (see the Marriage (Prescription of Religious Bodies) Regulations 
1977 SI 1977/1670), and those that are not prescribed, but in effect any religious body – 
defined in s.26(2)  of the 1977 Act as “an organized group of people meeting regularly for 
common religious worship” – can nominate a celebrant (s.9). See further Joe Thomson, 
Family Law in Scotland (London: Bloomsbury Professional, 2011), 14. 
90
 Disparaging reference was made during the debates on the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) 
Act 2013 to marriages in Scotland by members of the White Eagle Lodge, by pagans and by 
members of the National Union of Spiritualists. 
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 Temporary authorization under s.12 of the Act. 
37 
 
he was required to interpret the legislation in a way that was consistent with the European 
Convention on Human Rights, and that giving binding force to religious weddings but not to 
humanist ones might contravene the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
under s.9 of that Convention, which includes non-religious belief.92 The Marriage and Civil 
Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 (the 2014 Act), has now amended the 1977 Act to refer to a 
“religious or belief body” rather than a religious body.93   
The possibility of registration of a temporary celebrant has somewhat blurred the lines 
between recognition of a religious or belief body and recognition of individual applicants,94 
but s.14 of the 2014 Act clarifies the fact that such a celebrant must be a member of a 
religious or belief body. 
Furthermore, the Scottish legislature has also taken the opportunity in the 2014 Act to 
respond to public concerns about the need for celebrants to come from responsible 
organizations by including a requirement that recognized religious or belief bodies should 
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 “Pair tie knot at humanist wedding,” BBC News, June 18, 2005, accessed January 10, 2014, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4102310.stm. 
93
 Sections 11-12 and 22 of the 2014 Act. 
94
 Guidance provided on the National Records of Scotland website, on the question of 
whether it is possible for a family friend to solemnize a marriage, states: “If it is a religious 
marriage (which includes other belief systems) you are planning and your family friend is not 
already authorised to act as a celebrant, the Registrar General can grant a temporary 
authorisation for a particular marriage. A temporary authorisation can only be granted to 
someone who is affiliated to a religious body and who is supported by office bearers of that 
body or other belief system to conduct a marriage ceremony on its behalf.” 
(http://www.nrscotland.gov.uk/registration/getting-married-in-scotland) 
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meet certain “qualifying requirements”.95 Consultation on such qualifying requirements is 
due to take place in 2015, but an initial discussion paper (hereafter, the Discussion Paper) 
was issued in July 2014.96 According to that paper there are four main reasons behind the 
proposed introduction of qualifying requirements: (i) To ensure the continued reputation, 
dignity and solemnity of marriage and civil partnership ceremonies in Scotland; (ii) To 
combat sham marriages and civil partnerships, which are designed to avoid UK immigration 
controls; (iii) To combat forced marriages, and (iv) To ensure that marriage and civil 
partnership ceremonies are not carried out for profit or gain.97 These concerns will be 
considered further in Sections D and E. 
In contrast to English law, Scots law is very liberal as to the location of weddings.  A 
religious or belief wedding may take place anywhere that the celebrant will agree to. A civil 
wedding can be held in a registration office or in any of a list of approved places – but it is 
also possible to apply for “temporary approval” of a desired location.  
In each of the above examples – Spain, Sweden and Scotland – it is the religious 
organization that is recognized. The status of the celebrant as part of that organization ensures 
the validity of the marriage. An alternative approach is to authorize individual celebrants to 
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 Hannah Johnson and Heather Lyall, SPICe Briefing SB 13-51: Marriage and Civil 
Partnership (Scotland) Bill, November 25, 2013. The 2014 Act does not, however, specify 
these qualifying requirements but stipulates that they may be set out in regulations made by 
the Scottish Ministers. 
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 Marriage And Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014, The Qualifying Requirements: An 
Initial Paper, available at <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/resource/0045/00459045.pdf> 
Accessed December 30, 2014. 
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 See further below at 62. 
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solemnize marriages. This approach is adopted, to a greater or lesser extent, in e.g. the US, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand.98  In each case a mixture of approaches applies, with 
authorization of individual celebrants being one just one of the available methods of regulation. 
In the United States marriage regulation is a matter for State, rather than Federal, laws. 
The authority to solemnize marriages is typically conferred on judges or retired judges,99 
ministers of religion, and often also a variety of civic authorities. Some states also provide for 
the authorization of a marriage celebrant for one day, so that a member of the family or a 
friend of one of the intending spouses can officiate,100 or even allow “self-marriage”.101 The 
concept of “minister of religion” has provoked considerable difficulties. The definition of 
religion is a constitutional issue in the United States, since the First Amendment mandates the 
separation of church and state and the free exercise of religion. From at least the 1960s the 
concept has been given a broad, non-theistic definition. A footnote to the Supreme Court 
judgment in Torcaso v. Watkins102 states: “Among religions in this country which do not 
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 Jurisdiction to regulate marriage is allocated to the Federation in Australia, but at state and 
provincial level in the US and Canada. 
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 Often of specified courts. 
100
 Cal. Fam. Code, § 401 (a) and (b); Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 207, §.39. 
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 Colorado Revised Statutes 14-2-109 (1) provides that “a marriage may be solemnized … 
by the parties themselves”, but the informal approach to marriage accepted in Colorado is 
also demonstrated by the fact that it recognizes common law marriage where the parties 
cohabit, mutually agree to be married, and openly hold themselves out to the public as 
married (People v. Lucero, 747 P.2d 660 (Colo. 1987)). 
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 367 U.S. 488 (1961), fn 11.  Key US Supreme Court decisions contributing to the 
jurisprudence on the meaning of religion include United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 
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teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, 
Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others”.   
Against that background, the Humanist Society and other atheist and humanist 
organizations offer ordination for non-theist ministers, and such ministers are accepted as 
marriage celebrants in some States but not in others.103 Some States even accept as celebrants 
ministers from the Universal Life Church (ULC), which offers ordination online with no fee 
and no criteria to be satisfied.104 In discussing whether such “ministers” should be authorized, 
                                                          
(1965), and Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).  The concurring opinion of Adams 
CJ in Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3rd Circ. 1979) has also been influential and was 
critiqued by the Supreme Court in Regina (Hodkin and another) v. Registrar General for 
Births, Deaths and Marriages. 
103
 See for example Amanda Greene, “Humanists find ways to say ‘I do’ without God” 
Religion News Service, May 17, 2013, accessed September 30, 2013, 
http://www.religionnews.com/2013/05/17/humanists-find-ways-to-say-i-do-without-god/. A 
narrow view of the concept of minister of a religious denomination was taken in Washington 
DC, but the law has recently been changed to allow civil celebrants to officiate (the Marriage 
Officiant Amendment Act of 2013). 
104
 For details see Robert E. Rains, “Marriage in the Time of Internet Ministers: I Now 
Pronounce You Married, But Who Am I To Do So?” University of Miami Law Review 64 
(2010): 809.  In November 2012, a federal judge in Indiana refused a request by the atheist 
Center for Inquiry for expansion of the category of persons authorized to solemnize 
marriages, stating that a variety of avenues existed which permitted secular celebrants to play 
a role in marriage ceremonies, including ordination as a member of the Universal Life 
Church: see David Edwards, “Federal judge rules atheists must become ‘clergy’ to perform 
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several US courts have focused not on the scope of the right to exercise a religious belief but 
rather on the state’s control over the regulation of marriage. Being a minister of religion can 
thus be considered as a threshold test. This can be illustrated by the assertion of the Virginia 
Supreme Court in Cranmer v Commonwealth that the state has the “necessity that the 
marriage contract itself be memorialized in writing . . . by a person of responsibility and 
integrity and by one possessed of some educational qualifications.”105   
A recent New York decision adopts a different focus, commenting on “the inexorable 
trend toward marriages conducted by friends or relatives of a couple who have been ordained 
as ministers by internet churches”.  The court goes on to add that getting married is a serious 
decision with wide ranging consequences and emphasizes the importance of obtaining a 
wedding license.  
 
“It is easy to understand why couples might choose a friend or relative, rather than a 
judge or religious figure whom they have only just met, to play an important part in a 
hugely personal and momentous occasion. But to be able to dispense altogether with 
the legal requirements imposed by the State of New York makes the process too easy 
and robs it of the seriousness that is warranted in view of the responsibilities and 
obligations that marriage entails. With fewer and fewer marriages being performed 
                                                          
marriages,” The Raw Story, December 3, 2012, accessed  January 7, 2014, 
http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/12/03/federal-judge-rules-atheists-must-become-clergy-to-
perform-marriages/. 
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 202 S.E.2d 911 (Va. 1974), cited in Rains, “Marriage in the Time of Internet Ministers,” 
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with the attendant ritual and weight of a traditional religious practice, the reason for 
requiring a marriage license is that much more compelling.”106 
 
The concept of “minister of religion” is also contested in some Provinces in Canada. The 
Humanist Association of Canada is a recognized religious denomination in Ontario, and its 
appointed officiants may be licensed by the Province, but an application by the British 
Columbia Humanist Association to register religious representatives was recently rejected.107  
A similar range of approaches, from conservative to more liberal, can be found in respect of 
the persons licensed to solemnize civil marriages. In British Columbia, for example, the post 
of Marriage Commissioner is from time to time advertised by the government and 
appointments are made from respected members of the community, who must also be retired 
from their previous employment. In Quebec, the range of possible officiants is found in 
art.366 of the Civil Code.  Marriages may be solemnized by clerks and deputy clerks of the 
Superior Court who have been designated for that purpose, notaries, mayors, members of 
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 Ponorovskaya v Stecklow 2014 NY Slip Op 24140 Decided on May 29, 2014 Supreme 
Court, New York County. Cooper J comments on the conflict between different departments 
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municipal or borough councils and municipal officers designated by the Minister of Justice. 
A marriage may also be solemnized by a person who is temporarily designated as an officiant 
– so that the parties can select someone who is special to them.108  
A more general process of liberalization can be found in New Zealand and Australia. In 
New Zealand, the Marriage Act 1955109 ss. 8 ff. permits ministers of specified religions,110 
nominees of approved organizations – where the principal object or one of the principal 
objects of the organization is to uphold or promote religious beliefs or philosophical or 
humanitarian convictions – and other “persons of good character”, in particular Justices of the 
Peace, to be registered as marriage celebrants. Further conditions for registration of 
individual applicants are that the applicant will conscientiously perform the duties of a 
marriage celebrant under this Act and under the Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Relationships 
Registration Act 1995; and that it is in the interests of the public generally, or of a particular 
community (whether defined by geography, interest, belief, or some other factor) that the 
person in question be a marriage celebrant. 
In Australia111 there are three categories of persons who can solemnize marriages: 
ministers of a recognized religion, civil status officers for each State or Territory, and 
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 See the website Justice Québec, accessed January 7, 2014, 
http://www.justice.gouv.qc.ca/english/publications/generale/celebrant-a.htm. The relevant 
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 As amended by the Marriage Amendment Act 2010. 
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 Specified in Sch.1 to the 1955 Act. 
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“marriage celebrants” – who may in effect be any fit and proper person with the necessary 
skills who seeks registration as a celebrant.112 Some concerns have been expressed about over 
supply to the market for celebrants and lack of proper training.113 The Attorney General’s 
Department, which is responsible for regulation of marriage celebrants, is therefore 
implementing various reforms to enhance training, regulation and ongoing professional 
development.114 A significantly enhanced training requirement was introduced from 2010.115 
                                                          
Law International, 1997), 24: “In Australia, it is ridiculously easy to get married – there are 
virtually no formalities, and such as exist are regarded as directory, not mandatory. A 
marriage may be celebrated in any place and at any time …” 
112
 Section 39C of the Marriage Act 1961 deals with entitlement to be registered as a 
marriage celebrant and establishes a list of criteria. 
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 Responses to a consultation by the Attorney General’s Department. See the summary of 
feedback, accessed  February 28, 2014, 
http://www.ag.gov.au/FamiliesAndMarriage/Marriage/Pages/ChangestotheMarriageCelebran
tsProgram.aspx. See also, David Humphries, “I do, I do … but unfortunately some marriage 
celebrants don’t,” The Sydney Morning Herald, December 10, 2011, accessed January 8, 
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In addition, a policy of cost recovery in relation to the services provided to marriage 
celebrants116 has meant the introduction of an initial registration application fee and an annual 
registration charge.117 There are thus disincentives to becoming a celebrant for anyone who 
does not intend to take it seriously and to conduct a significant number of ceremonies. 
 
Comparison with other jurisdictions thus suggests that the approach to regulation of 
marriage under English law is unusual, and unusually complex.  Many jurisdictions have a far 
more inflexible approach, recognizing only civil marriage.  This takes place in the civil status 
or vital statistics offices for the residence of one of the parties, although some variation 
exists, and there seems to be a move towards privatization of civil status functions, with the 
result that notaries (in particular) are acquiring new marriage celebrating and divorce granting 
competences in some civil law jurisdictions. Where marriage in religious form is also 
recognized as having civil effects, it is typically the religious body that is authorized to 
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 These services include assessing and authorising new marriage celebrants for registration, 
reviewing celebrant performance, resolving complaints about celebrants, handling a large 
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solemnize marriages in accordance with its rites: the place of solemnization is a matter for 
ritual laws.  Alternatively non-religious organizations or individual celebrants may be 
authorized. This approach has been adopted in several common law jurisdictions – with 
varying degrees of regulation of celebrants, including the authorization as celebrant of a 
friend of the couple getting married, or an ‘internet minister’. 
 
D – RECENT ATTEMPTS AT LAW REFORM 
 
The above historical and comparative tours demonstrate how the English law focus on 
place of worship is a product of its history of church-state relations coupled with registration 
requirements arising out of past religious discrimination,118 and that the trend in countries 
which do not have a compulsory civil ceremony before a civil status official is towards 
allowing couples greater freedom of choice as to the celebrant – who may be required to meet 
certain performance standards.  But the regulation of marriage is a subject that excites 
passions, and where there are strong conflicts of view that make any change to the law 
difficult.119   
Compulsory solemnization by civil status officials and a system of licensed celebrants or 
officiants have both been considered for adoption in England. Indeed uniform civil 
preliminaries, rather than Church of England banns and licenses, have been proposed ever 
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 The speech of Lord Wilson in R. (Hodkin and another) v Registrar General of Births, 
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since the reforms of 1836.120  There is nevertheless little indication of enthusiasm for 
mandatory civil marriage, following the French model. A Law Commission Working Party 
noted in 1973 that  
 
[t]he introduction of such a system would have the advantages that flow from 
uniformity in arrangements for the solemnisation of marriage; nevertheless, it 
was our impression, when we issued the Working Paper, that it would not be 
generally acceptable unless, at any rate, no other satisfactory method of 
improving the present arrangements was possible. Consultation has not altered 
this impression. 121 
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 Until recently that proposal had been resisted successfully by the Church (see Cretney, 
Family Law in the Twentieth Century, 9 ff.) but a breach has been made in the control of the 
Church over those preliminaries by the Immigration Act 2014. As a result of concerns over 
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Law Commission, Solemnisation of Marriage in England and Wales (Law Com No.53, 
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Views were expressed both for and against this position when the issue arose tangentially 
during the debates on the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill.122  
A celebrant model was also identified as a possibility in the 1973 Law Commission 
Report.123 But in the end, the Law Commission was simply unable to reach agreement on the 
central issue of the conduct of the marriage ceremony: 
 
Some of us take the view that if the preliminaries laid down by the law are 
complied with, and if there is present at the wedding at least one person qualified 
to supervise the solemnisation of the marriage and see that it is duly registered 
then the law need require no more and that the actual place where or time when 
the marriage is solemnised is unimportant. Others share the view of the Working 
Party that all marriages should be celebrated at a place prescribed by law within 
permitted hours, subject to the discretionary powers of the Archbishop of 
Canterbury and the Registrar General to deal with exceptional cases. We are … 
content to express the different views in the hope that others may continue the 
discussion and arrive at an agreed basis for legislation.124 
 
This celebrant model was actively pursued during the period 1999-2004, starting with the 
publication by the Registrar General for England and Wales of a consultation paper on 
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modernizing the registration service.125 As a result of the consultation, a White Paper on Civil 
Registration: Vital Change was published in 2002,126 which among other things proposed a 
move to a celebrant system, influenced by the laws discussed above and in particular those of 
Scotland, Australia and New Zealand. Some flesh was given to the proposals,127 and the 
intention was to implement them in stages via Regulatory Reform Orders under the 
Regulatory Reform Act 2001. But when the first draft Order, concerning the registration of 
births and deaths, was laid before Parliament in 2004, the House of Commons Regulatory 
Reform Select Committee and the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform 
Committee recommended that the order-making power under the Regulatory Reform Act 
2001 should not be used, notably because the proposed measures could not be described as 
uncontroversial.128 No steps were taken to bring forward the primary legislation that would 
otherwise be required.129 
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 See in particular, General Register Office, Civil Registration: Delivering Vital Change 
(Regulatory Reform Order consultation document, 2003). 
128
 Regulatory Reform Committee, Proposal for the Regulatory Reform (Registration of 
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A more limited proposal extending the range of options for the celebration of marriage 
was raised in a Private Member’s Bill in 2012130 and then during the passage of the Marriage 
(Same-Sex Couples) Act. Amendments were formulated by the British Humanist Society.131 
At first a proposal was made to create a category of “approved organizations”132 which would 
be subject to the same regulation as Jews and Quakers.  This proposal was not accepted in the 
Public Bill Committee, following the view expressed by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
of State for Women and Equalities that the Government could not support the amendment 
because it involved structural change to the rules governing the solemnities of marriage 
which went well beyond the limited purposes of the Bill, placed a difficult burden on the 
Registrar General in deciding which organizations should be approved, and risked 
undermining the quadruple lock. After various consultations, a new amendment specifically 
identifying humanists was proposed at the Report Stage in the House of Commons, but was 
withdrawn again on the basis of an assessment by the Attorney-General that it was not 
compatible with the Human Rights Act 1998 as prioritizing one non-religious belief 
                                                          
papers/sn03709.pdf.  The project was paused in September 2010 and there are currently no 
plans to continue it.   
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organization over another.133 As a compromise, the 2013 Act provides, in s.14(4) that “the 
Secretary of State may by order make provision for and in connection with permitting 
marriages according to the usages of belief organizations to be solemnized on the authority of 
certificates of a superintendent registrar”. Section 14(1) requires the Secretary of State to 
arrange for a review as to whether such an order should be made, and if so the form it should 
take. Consultation was undertaken in July to September 2014 and the results were published, 
along with the Government’s response (hereafter, the 2014 Consultation Response), on 
December 18, 2014. 134  
The aim of the consultation was “to seek views on whether there is a substantial case for 
permitting legally valid marriage ceremonies for those of humanist belief and potentially 
other non-religious belief, or whether the current approach should remain.” There were also 
further questions as to the organizations that might fall within the s.14 definition of a belief 
organization as “an organization whose principal or sole purpose is the advancement of a 
system of non-religious beliefs which relate to morality or ethics”; the locations in which 
valid belief marriage ceremonies should be allowed to take place; and any safeguards that 
should be put in place. 
It was clear that the majority of those responding to the consultation were connected to 
the British Humanists Association, and had made use of a standard form response to the 
consultation. They were in favor of the law being changed to allow valid belief marriage 
ceremonies, arguing that the current law is discriminatory since it does not allow them to 
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marry in a legal ceremony rooted in their beliefs conducted by a person who shares those 
beliefs, or in a place that is personally meaningful to them. They took the view that there 
should be no restriction on available locations for the ceremony, including outdoors, since the 
important criterion was the meaning attached to the place by the parties.  Respondents who 
opposed a change in the law were particularly concerned about the risk of relaxed regulation 
leading to more forced and sham marriages and inappropriate ceremonies. In addition, local 
registration services offered the opinion that the demand from couples was for outdoor 
marriages rather than belief ceremonies. 
On consideration of the responses, the Government has concluded that it is not possible 
to implement changes in the law of marriage to accommodate belief organizations without 
further review.  Equality issues predominate.  Allowing belief marriages at unrestricted 
locations creates an inequality for the majority of religious groups and couples who are 
restricted to their church or registered place of worship; qualifying tests for organizations 
permitted to celebrate marriages are difficult to formulate in a way that is not discriminatory 
– both in terms of determining the definition of a “belief organization” and in terms of the 
parallel treatment of religious and belief organizations.  The order making power under s.14 
of the 2013 Act, is insufficient to permit the wider changes in the law needed to deal with 
these issues. 
 
“[T]here is no option which we think can be implemented immediately which would 
provide for complete equality of treatment between those who have religious beliefs, 
those with humanist or other non-religious beliefs, and couples more generally.”135 
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The Law Commission is therefore being asked to review the law concerning marriage 
ceremonies with a view to more comprehensive reforms. Whether any Law Commission 
proposals will finally be adopted as legislation is, of course, a different matter – but given the 
issues raised by the Consultation Response and the emphasis on equality issues, it is difficult 
to see how rules structured around a registered place of worship could survive. 
 
F  –  THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE SOLEMNIZATION  
 
At the time of Lord Hardwicke’s Act, three interests significantly coincided: the interest 
of the state in providing some certainty as to who was married and avoiding clandestine 
marriages through the publicity of a church wedding; the interest of the Anglican Church in 
celebrating the sacrament of matrimony and reinforcing its position in society; and the 
interest of the couple in obtaining God’s blessing on their new life together. But the picture 
has changed. New ways exist of obtaining a reliable record of civil status. Clandestine 
marriage is no longer a significant concern. Church congregations have dwindled and with 
them the Christian significance of marriage.  What are the modern drivers shaping any reform 
of the law on solemnization of marriages? 
 
(i) The interests of the couple 
    Writing with specific reference to the United States, Andrew Cherlin has argued that 
although the practical importance of marriage has declined, its “symbolic” importance has 
increased.136 “Whereas marriage used to be the foundation of adult family life, now it is often 
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the capstone … Being married is less of a social role and more of an individual achievement 
– a symbol of successful self-development.”  This may be particularly true of America, but it 
also reflects to some extent developments in Britain.  Marriage may not, in general, be held in 
such high regard – but it is increasingly postponed until a couple have achieved personal and 
job security and can afford to celebrate their relationship in style. This symbolic value can 
also be seen in the campaign for same sex marriage: it was not about obtaining rights, for 
they could already be acquired through civil partnership. Rather it was about celebrating a 
loving and committed relationship, and enjoying status and esteem equal to that of 
heterosexual married couples.  
     A wedding is a couple’s “celebrity moment”, and this creates the incentive to plan an 
individualized event.  The trend in this direction can be seen in celebrant advertising of 
services tailored to the requirements of the parties. It is seen in the rise of weddings abroad 
and television shows that celebrate the variety of weddings. It is reflected in the desire of a 
bride and groom to ask a family member or friend to officiate.  And it is seen in the insistence 
by members of the British Humanist Association in the 2014 Consultation Response that it 
should be possible to get married at a place that has “personal meaning”. The 2014 
Consultation Response notes that many people who are not religious have spiritual beliefs 
that they would like reflected in a wedding ceremony, and that some might want multi-faith 
elements. The law currently has no way of accommodating these desires.  Moreover, media 
representations of marriages in a variety of forms and locations foster dissatisfaction with the 
more restrictive rules of English law. 
From the couple’s perspective, the logical way forward is the removal of obstacles to 
their free expression of their individualism.   
 
(ii) The interest of the state 
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Rains concludes, after his survey of US laws on the regulation of marriage celebrants: 
 
Today, it is difficult to perceive of a valid and enforceable reason for the state to 
demand a particular marriage methodology for the couple who have obtained a 
license ensuring their eligibility and intent to marry, as long as the fact of their 
marriage is then duly registered with the state. The state may validly regulate who 
may enter into marriage … and enforce those rules by a licensure requirement. The 
state may validly require registration of the marriage for recordkeeping purposes. 
But the day is simply over that the state can meaningfully regulate who may officiate 
when the couple signify their present-tense declaration of entry into marriage, or even 
require any officiant other than the couple themselves.137 
 
Nevertheless, in the United Kingdom, the state does claim some residual interest in the 
regulation of such formalities. Three reasons for this can be argued: (a) an officiant may be 
best placed to detect if there is some element of fraud or duress involved in the marriage and 
thus to assist the state in policing access to residence and nationality and preventing forced 
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marriages; (b) there may be a desire to control quality;138  (c) different marriage models have 
different resource implications for the state.  
 
(a) Policing marriage 
Current levels of media hysteria and government concern about sham marriage139 and 
forced marriages, in the UK and other EU Member States, seem indicative of moral panic 
rather than a reasoned response to the data.  Nevertheless, there is clear evidence that 
marriages of convenience are regularly arranged for immigration purposes and that this an 
area in which organized crime groups are active, and which may also involve human 
trafficking.140 And whether the number of forced marriages is large or small, this is a 
phenomenon which needs to be taken seriously and handled sensitively. 
In the United Kingdom, an increasing focus is being placed on the need for thorough 
preliminaries in order to detect sham marriages, but both civil and religious preliminaries 
have been found wanting in this regard.141 The Government had sought to control such 
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marriages through the requirement of a Certificate of Approval, first introduced in 2005,142 
whereby a fee was payable, and the applicant had to have sufficient leave to remain in the UK 
before qualifying for the certificate.143 The scheme was challenged under, inter alia, Arts 12 
and 14 ECHR. It was found to be in breach of those provisions in the national courts144 and 
before the European Court of Human Rights145 and during the course of the proceedings was 
modified and eventually withdrawn. 
Nevertheless, the European Court of Human Rights specifically noted that: 
 
[I]n the context of immigration laws and for justified reasons, the States may be 
entitled to prevent marriages of convenience, entered into solely for the purpose of 
securing an immigration advantage. However, the relevant laws – which must also 
meet the standards of accessibility and clarity required by the Convention – may not 
otherwise deprive a person or a category of persons of full legal capacity of the right 
to marry with the partners of their choice.146 
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The Immigration Act 2014 has now changed the procedure for civil preliminaries for 
marriage, while at the same time requiring civil preliminaries rather than Church of England 
preliminaries in all cases where one or both parties is not a “relevant national”.147   The 
period between the parties giving notice of the marriage and the wedding ceremony has been 
extended to 28 days for all marriages, to allow longer for review of the evidence submitted in 
order to detect potential abuse.  Where one or both the parties is not a relevant national, and 
has limited or no immigration status in the UK, or fails to provide specified evidence of 
immigration status, the proposed marriage or civil partnership will be referred to the Home 
Office and the notice period may be extended to 70 days. 148  Expertise as to the indicia of 
sham marriages can thus be concentrated within the Home Office. 
    In relation to forced marriages, a range of prevention measures are used and expertise is 
concentrated in the Forced Marriage Unit, a joint Foreign and Commonwealth Office and 
Home Office unit established in January 2005. Often the victim is taken abroad to get 
married, so the involvement of registration services in the United Kingdom is limited – but it 
is claimed that many forced marriages also take place in the United Kingdom and a factsheet 
has been produced for registrars. Arguably more could be done at the point when a 
superintendent registrar’s certificate is sought. Clark and Richards compare the approach 
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adopted in England with that introduced in France.149  There the age of marriage has been 
raised and civil status officers must interview the parties giving notice of their intention to 
marry unless such an interview is impossible or is “deemed unnecessary”.150 This measure 
was originally introduced in 2003 as a measure to prevent sham marriages, and arguably 
experience in dealing with sham marriages in the United Kingdom could also be drawn on in 
the context of forced marriages. 
Both marriages of convenience and forced marriage are relevant to EU policy making 
since rights to family reunification are an important aspect of the right of free movement of 
persons in Europe. In relation to the former, the European Commission has recently produced 
a Handbook on addressing the issue of alleged marriages of convenience between EU citizens 
and non-EU nationals in the context of EU law on free movement of EU citizens (hereafter, 
the Handbook)151 which aims to set out European principles, best practice and avenues for 
co-ordination and support of individual Member State initiatives.   
How might this then impact on celebrants? The Discussion Paper produced by the 
Scottish Government moots the possibility that the “qualifying requirements” should include 
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a knowledge of the relevant legislation on sham and forced marriages, as well as some 
awareness training, so that celebrants are more likely to identify such marriages.  And if the 
involvement of celebrants in preventing sham or forced marriages is seen as an important 
detective measure then there are good arguments for more stringent regulation of celebrants.  
But it must be doubted whether reliance on celebrants is likely to be effective: in the past 
there has been a history of complicity or complaisance on the part of clergymen and variable 
reporting of suspicious marriages by register offices; and individual celebrants are likely to 
have limited exposure to the problem. The Immigration Act 2014 channels investigation to 
the Home Office in order to concentrate expertise in one place, and this seems the most 
effective way forward.   
The European Commission Handbook, drawing on expertise from across EU Member 
States, describes the detection of marriages of convenience as a “long haul process”. 
 
Often, it will only be possible to successfully conclude an individual case of abuse 
after having observed the couple and their marital conduct for an adequate period of 
time and collecting required evidence. 152 
 
The Commission identifies the main investigation techniques used by national 
authorities as:  simultaneous interviews or questionnaires; document and background 
checks; and inspections by law enforcement, immigration or other competent authorities 
(in registered residences, places of employment, schools etc) and community-based 
checks to check whether the couple is living together and jointly administer their 
household. It comments that, according to experts, interviews are “the most effective 
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technique to verify whether the spouses give non-conflicting, consistent and correct 
information about the other spouse, their past relationship and future plans.”  Given this 
perspective, it seems unreasonable to place much weight on the role of celebrants – 
particularly if scruples about commercialization153 mean that they are not being 
financially rewarded for their actions. 
 
(b) Quality control 
The 2003 consultation paper Civil Registration: Delivering Vital Change adverted to the 
need for a code of practice for registration authorities to ensure that an appropriate level of 
service was available to all, and that the importance and dignity of the ceremony was 
maintained.154 The debates in Parliament concerning the proposed amendments to the 
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill also gave voice to doubts about celebrant marriages and 
the potential for obscure or outrageous forms of ceremony – such as Jedi marriages155 (or 
indeed, although it escaped parliamentary notice, Pastafarian ministers who conduct 
marriages for the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster156). Similar concerns are expressed 
in the 2014 Consultation Response.  The response states that the Government wants to see 
“further consideration of managing risk through the use of qualifying criteria, particularly in 
relation to preventing sham and forced marriages, inappropriate ceremonies, and the 
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commercialization of marriage solemnization.”157   It is clear from the terminology of the 
response that it takes account of, and is influenced by the same considerations as the 
Discussion Paper.  The Discussion Paper notes that two of the objectives behind the proposed 
introduction of the requirements are “[t]o ensure the continued reputation, dignity and 
solemnity of marriage and civil partnership ceremonies in Scotland” and “[t]o ensure that 
marriage and civil partnership ceremonies are not carried out for profit or gain.”158  It notes 
that secondary commercial services – such as hotel, photography and tourism services – 
inevitably attach to weddings, but expresses the view that the ceremony itself should not be 
commercialized. “Instead, the ceremony should focus on the couple and about them 
committing to each other in their faith or belief.”  
In fact, one of the benefits of the requirement that religious organizations solemnize 
marriages at a registered place of worship is that indirectly this provides quality control: it 
manifests a certain level of administrative organization and reliability. This is a reason for the 
durability of the requirement despite its appearance as a relic of former religious 
discrimination. The application for registration as a place for solemnization of marriages 
must be made by the proprietor or trustee of a building certified as a place of religious 
worship, and the process of registration requires that the application form be signed by a 
minimum of twenty householders who regard the building as their usual place of worship and 
then countersigned by the proprietor or trustee. There is, thus, evidence of investment in and 
management of property, and of a number of adherents to the religion. 159 
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But it is not at all obvious that those contemplating marriage today desire enforced 
dignity and decorum over individual self-expression and the choice between gravitas and 
exuberance.  The difficulty of defining a “belief organization” means that a system of 
regulation that prioritizes the parties “committing to each other in their faith or belief” is 
unlikely to be operable, and the Discussion Paper recognizes that identifying the elements of 
a celebrant service that are for profit or gain is not straightforward.  Celebrants will incur 
legitimate expenses, as may others involved in the ceremony; there may also be training costs 
for celebrants, and building maintenance costs; it may be difficult to distinguish between a 
payment for a commercial service and a donation in gratitude for the service provided. 
Arguably, therefore, the maintenance of standards could simply be seen as a consumer 
protection measure in relation to a service provided commercially by celebrants.  The 
important factor would then be whether the celebrant provided the type and level of service 
advertised.  Moreover it is worth pointing out that marriage at a registered place of worship 
or approved premises does not escape the problem of financial incentives.  Eekelaar refers to 
the need “to use ‘approved' premises in an environment where local authorities encourage 
applications for such approval as a business opportunity, and the whole system seems 
designed to extract the expenditure of as much money as possible,”160 while many churches 
also regard wedding fees and charges for additional services as important sources of 
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revenue.161  The 2014 Consultation Response notes that the opposition of the Church of 
England to outdoor weddings in circumstances where religious bodies could not offer the 
same service, and the absence of this element in the ‘wedding portfolio’ of the Church would 
undoubtedly place it at a competitive disadvantage. 
 
 
(c) Marriage model resource implications 
During the debates on the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Bill, Baroness Berridge noted 
that some religious organizations were considering whether or not to continue to solemnize 
marriages in so far as in doing so they were performing a public registration function and 
might face litigation under equal treatment legislation if they refused to solemnize same sex 
marriages, which would have “resource implications for the government”.162  If religious 
organizations cease to perform that role, and in the absence of any system of civil celebrants, 
there will be an additional need for registrars. On the other hand, if a celebrant system is 
introduced, the regulation of that system may itself impose certain costs. This consideration 
links to both to the policing of marriages and questions of quality control. For example, 
privatization of the solemnization of marriages in the majority of cases might allow greater 
conservation of resources for investigation of potential cases of fraud and duress.  And the 
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cost of a celebrant system will depend on the level of regulation and the amount that may be 
recouped in license fees.163  
 
It is submitted that the arguments for state supervision of marriage solemnization are 
unconvincing. Celebrants would play a minor role in the policing of marriages, while quality 
control and resource management issues depend on a variety of decisions and mechanisms. 
Becoming a licensed celebrant could, for example, be an option for marketing purposes, 
rather than a legal obligation.  Given the choice, a significant number of people might choose 
to have a trusted friend, family member or representative of a religious or belief organisation 
solemnize their marriage. 
 
(iii) The interests of religious organizations 
The debate over same sex marriage has once again put issues of toleration and 
conscience at the heart of the regulation of marriage.  Religious organizations are divided on 
the question of same-sex marriage. Some welcome it, seeing it as an opportunity to extend 
care to LGBT members of their community, and to bring the gospel to a new audience. 
Others strongly oppose it – arguing that marriage is and should remain the union of a man 
and a woman. To meet this position, the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013 contains the 
“quadruple lock” described above164 to protect the position of those who do not want to 
solemnize such marriages. But doubts about the efficacy of the quadruple lock remain, and 
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many of those who currently officiate at religious marriages would withdraw from that 
activity if they felt compelled to solemnize same sex marriages.165  
Indeed, the issue of recognition of same sex unions as marriage has provoked a much 
wider debate within church communities internationally as to whether “civil marriage” is now 
– looking at the accumulated changes to the institution – so distinct from “Christian 
marriage” that the churches should withdraw from their role in the ceremony. The founder of 
the Radical Orthodoxy movement, Professor John Millbank, has suggested that: 
 
Perhaps, in order to safeguard the churches from pressures to conform to the 
norm, we should now welcome a withdrawal from the churches of their rights as a 
civil marriage broker. This would leave the churches free, in their turn, to claim 
that only natural and sacramental marriage are genuinely "marriage," while state 
marriage is mere civil union.166 
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More concrete steps in this direction have been taken by those who have signed up to the 
“Marriage Pledge” promoted by Ephraim Radner and Christopher Seitz and set out in the 
publication First Things.167  The signatories agree that  
 
The new definition of marriage no longer coincides with the Christian understanding 
of marriage between a man and woman. … To continue with church practices that 
intertwine government marriage with Christian marriage will implicate the Church in 
a false definition of marriage. 
 
They commit themselves to “disengaging civil and Christian marriage in the performance 
of our pastoral duties”, refusing to “serve as agents of the state in marriage”.  The Marriage 
Pledge has so far attracted a rather small number of signatories, although it has been discussed 
in both the United States and the United Kingdom. Unsurprisingly, the viewpoints expressed 
reflect both the particular theological stance of the writer on the nature of marriage and the 
legal context within which the writer is situated.  Thus the reaction of a conservative 
Reformed Christian in the United States, supporting covenant marriage, embedded in a 
tradition of separation of Church and State, and generally hostile to state encroachment on the 
private sphere will be radically different to that of a Church of England clergyman, a member 
of the established church, whose role goes beyond solemnization of the marriage and includes 
civil status registration functions.168 
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The stance of the Church of England on this issue is apparent from its response to the 
consultation on marriage equality:  
 
“In law, there is one social institution called marriage, which can be entered into 
through either a religious or a civil ceremony. To suggest that this involves two kinds 
of marriage is to make the category error of mistaking the ceremony for the institution 
itself.” 169 
 
Furthermore, specifically in relation to the marriage pledge, it has been noted that 
Anglican clergy are unlikely to become signatories since  
 
“[a]n overarching requirement in England and Wales is the common law duty on the 
Church of England and the Church in Wales to perform marriages. ... This arises 
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from the Church of England’s status as the established church in England, and the 
‘vestiges of establishment’ pertaining to the Church in Wales.”  
 
The duty to perform marriages is a duty owed to all parishioners, whether or not they 
are members of the Church.170  Any change in this duty would require a change in the 
law, and the refusal of a clergyman to solemnize marriages goes beyond an issue of 
individual conscience.  Withdrawal from this function would therefore be a seismic 
change and not one likely to occur while the quadruple lock holds fast. 
But the debate continues internationally and further internal and external challenges 
to the position of churches and other religious organizations who are unwilling to 
participate in the solemnization of same sex marriages can be expected.  The issue is not 
just one of continued reference to “place of worship” in the requirements for a valid 
marriage, but also one of the place of religion in the public sphere. Opposing the call to 
disengage from the solemnization of marriages that produce civil effects are those who 
consider that by doing so the churches would fail in their “duty to proclaim the truth 
about marriage in the secular order and matrimony in the religious”,171 and believe that 
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the public platform provided by state recognition of religious marriage ceremonies should 
not willingly be abandoned. 
There is a diversity of views as to the role that religious bodies should perform in 
marriages that produce civil effects, but a shared interest in ensuring continued freedom 
of religion and the opportunity to advocate on matters of conscience in the public sphere. 
 
(iv) A radical solution? 
If the state’s interest in the solemnization of marriages is strictly limited, as suggested 
above, then perhaps a thorough reappraisal of the formal requirements for marriage is in 
order. Eekelaar has proposed a “radical solution” in which state interests are focused on the 
marriage preliminaries and the attestation of the consent of the parties to the marriage, 
leaving the ceremony itself unregulated. 
 
Most people see marriage as a major event in their personal lives, which for many 
can only be adequately expressed if it has been brought about in a manner in 
accordance with a deeply held belief, or in a way that holds strong meaning for them. 
The logical (if radical) outcome of recognizing this is that it should not matter what 
type of ceremony accompanies the formation of the marriage if it fulfils those 
requirements for the parties. … [T]his strategy would make the secular law relating 
to the consequences of marriage available to all unions which the parties see as being 
a marriage, provided only that certain preliminary formalities are fulfilled. Nothing 
needs to be stipulated about the ceremony itself, where it is to be held, or even the 
form of words used. Agreement between the parties has always been the essence of 
marriage, and all that needs to be attested is that the parties have, at a certain time 
and place, agreed freely to enter into marriage with one another.  
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A major advantage of the mandatory civil ceremony required in France and many other 
civil law jurisdictions is legal certainty: the requirements for a valid marriage are clear and so 
it is easy to disseminate information about them. It is easier to insist on strict enforcement if 
the parties can be expected to know and understand the legal requirements. But the 
uninspiring character of purely formal civil ceremony and the need for two ceremonies for 
those who want a religious or belief marriage mean that it has never acquired popularity as an 
option for England and Wales. On the other hand, if the formalities of the ceremony are 
effectively reduced to the witnessed exchange of consents, this in itself is an easy message to 
communicate – along with a strong emphasis on the necessity of first obtaining a license.172 
Any necessary investigation of the parties’ capacity or desire to marry is then focused at the 
licensing stage – where relevant with appropriate Home Office assistance.  Since this seems 
to be the direction that the law is already taking, the radical solution would not require a 
significant policy change.  As is currently the case in Scotland, the license or schedule would 
be a form requiring details of the parties, the witnesses and any celebrant, which would then 
be signed by the parties and witnesses at the time of the wedding and returned to the register 
office.173   
Such an approach would certainly accommodate the interests of the intending spouses.  It 
would also accommodate the interests of non-religious belief organization, and individual 
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celebrants who currently offer a service which is not recognized as having any civil effects. 
As to whether it would accommodate the interests of religious organizations, there are 
positive and negative considerations. It would provide a more flexible framework within 
which to place religious marriage ceremonies, since the minister or other celebrant would not 
be performing a function essential to the ‘civil’ marriage itself, and it might allow religious 
organizations to ‘compete’ more effectively in the market for celebrancy services, since 
location would be less of an issue. This would provide the continued opportunity for such 
organizations to proclaim their views on marriage and to treat a marriage service as an act of 
worship. On the other hand, there is also the risk that religious ceremonies would instead lose 
some of their attractiveness if a wider range of alternatives became available. Furthermore, a 
more flexible framework would in all probability be detrimental to institutional discipline on 
issues such as same sex marriage. These considerations will be evaluated differently by 
different religious organizations. 
A practical problem associated with the radical solution is the difficulty in ensuring that a 
marriage will be registered once it has been celebrated.174 The objectives of the registration 
system are twofold: to create legal documents that are used to establish and protect the civil 
rights of individuals, and to establish a data source for the compilation of vital statistics. 
Many countries use the criminal law to enforce registration, but this is clearly less effective 
than control at the point of delivery. Nevertheless, a change in the system of registration was 
proposed in the context of the modernization program Civil Registration: Vital Change, 
adopting an approach similar to that employed in Scotland. Under that system a schedule is 
issued by the registration authority on completion of the preliminaries, and is returned after 
the ceremony with the signatures of the celebrant, the couple getting married and the 
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witnesses.175 Moreover, in an era when cohabitation rather than marriage is increasingly 
common, a significant proportion of marriages take place abroad,176 and many marriages end 
in divorce, methods for capturing the demographic details of the nation other than the 
registration of marriages must of necessity be utilized. 
Practical issues are not the predominant consideration in regulating marriage, and the law 
has proved resistant to change. Traditions are strong.  Throughout the centuries, each 
amendment has proved controversial. Rather, the law has developed through a series of minor 
accretions. On the other hand, even a measure as controversial as the Marriage (Same Sex 
Couples) Act 2013 can be steered through Parliament if the government of the day is 
sufficiently determined. But it must be noted that the 2013 Act was limited in purpose, and 
that all efforts to extend the range of reforms to the law of marriage during its passage 
through Parliament were rebuffed.  
 
(v) Conclusions 
 
If not in the short term, then at least in the medium term, significant change in the 
English law on the solemnization of marriages seems likely – driven by some combination of 
individualism, equal treatment concerns and the repercussions of same sex marriage.  It is 
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 Traditionally the best man takes responsibility for returning the schedule, although legally 
it is the responsibility of the couple: see Civil Registration: Delivering Vital Change, para. 
3.4.106 ff 
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 No statistics relating to such marriages are available, but a range of newspaper reports and 
polls suggest a steep climb in the numbers during the last ten years. They are thought to 
account for approximately 20-25 percent of all marriages. 
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implausible that marriage at a “registered place of worship” will survive this change, but this 
is a reform that is long overdue.  The particular political and religious factors and social 
concerns that led to this form of regulation no longer exist and a comparative survey shows 
that English law is complex and anomalous. 
While a system of licensed celebrants is one plausible way forward, the more radical 
solution described above deserves consideration.  Indeed, perhaps it is not so radical.  In a 
certain sense it even looks like a return full circle to the ecclesiastical law rule that a valid 
marriage required only an exchange of promises.  A return to marriage “in a house, in the 
street, in the fields, or at a tavern”.  But, in fact much would have changed. Apart from a 
requirement of witnesses, the preliminaries to marriage and machinery for registration have 
become increasingly robust, with the potential to obtain any requisite evidence of status and 
capacity to marry,177 obviating the publicity function of the ecclesiastical law rules and their 
statutory descendants. 
As the rules on licensing become increasingly complex, perhaps it is time for radical 
simplification of the requirements for the marriage itself: a radical simplification which 
removes the need for the state to involve itself in the distinction between religious and non-
religious ceremonies, does away with the distinctions based on the discriminatory provisions 
of previous centuries, and provides a bright line rule establishing license and witnessed 
consent as the criteria for a valid marriage. 
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 Further measures to strengthen the preliminaries are currently under consideration by 
Parliament: Immigration, HC Bill (2013-14) [128]. 
